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Towards a European strategy on culture and development: Lear-
ning from the CARIFORUM-EU Economic Partnership Agreement
This article examines the EU’s recent attempts to formulate a policy position 
on culture in its external relations, and in particular in the area of development 
cooperation. The paper focuses on the blueprint for this that was set out in the 
EU-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) completed in 2008. 
The content and record of implementation of the EPA’s cultural provisions are 
examined and situated within broader debates concerning the “instrumental” 
role of culture in development. Some of the lessons learned from the EPA are 
then used to draw out some critical reflections about the EU’s emerging strategy 
on culture and development.
Vers une stratégie européenne de la culture et du dévéloppement : 
Leçons tirées de l’Accord de partenariat économique CARIFORUM-
EU
 
Cet article examine les tentatives récentes de l’UE de définir la place de la culture 
dans ces relations extérieures, et en particulier dans le domaine de la coopéra-
tion pour le développement. L’article se concentre sur le modèle proposé dans 
le cadre de l’Accord de partenariat économique (APE) UE-CARIFORUM conclu 
en 2008. Le contenu et dispositions de mise en œuvre des clauses culturelles de 
l’APE sont examinés et resitués dans le débat plus large sur le rôle « instrumen-
tal » de la culture dans les politiques de développement. Certaines des leçons 
tirées de l’APE sont ensuite utilisées pour formuler quelques réflexions critiques 
quant à la stratégie émergente de l’UE pour la culture et le développement.
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Towards a European strategy
on culture and development
Learning from the CARIFORUM-EU
Economic Partnership Agreement1
Ben Garner
University of Portsmouth
T here has been a growing interest over the last decade in the role that culture can play in the external affairs of the European Union (EU). 
An important milestone in this has been the adoption of the Strategy for 
International Cultural Relations by the European Commission and the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (European 
Commission, 2016). Although there have been explicit references to culture 
in the EU’s international engagements for some time, these have tended to be 
rather fragmented and without any overarching policy framework. They have 
also been inhibited by the fact that culture has been, and remains, largely a 
competence of Member States. The new Strategy attempts to overcome these 
issues by proposing a set of guiding principles for external cultural relations 
while signalling a commitment to a more coordinated EU approach on the 
issue. This reflects a chorus of calls from civil society, Member States and EU 
institutions over the last decade and forms part of the current Commission’s 
priority to strengthen the EU’s clout as a global actor.
In the words of Isar (2015), culture in the external relations of the EU is 
“an idea whose time has come”. How this new vision will be translated into 
action however remains to be seen. In his account of the formation of this 
idea over the last decade, Isar (2015) suggests that the phrase which has come 
to be used by EU actors in related discussions and documents – “culture in 
external relations” – is itself indicative since it implies more than simply 
the ambition to enhance “soft power” that is usually contained in the more 
common phrase “cultural diplomacy” (which tends to be deployed by Member 
1 Research for the paper was carried out with the support of the UK’s Economic 
and Social Research Council. Thanks to a number of colleagues for comments 
and conversations on the content of this paper, in particular: Antonios Vlassis; 
Keith Nurse; Suzanne Burke and two anonymous reviewers.
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States but is used sparingly by EU institutions, if at all).2 While soft power 
goals are undoubtedly present in the vision that has come to be articulated by 
the EU, the notion of “culture in external relations”, it is argued, has evolved 
to have a broader meaning for EU actors: it signals a commitment to the 
values of global cultural citizenship and the promotion of cultural diversity 
in a way that is driven by a series of “idealistic” rather than “expedient” or 
“instrumental” motives. In this sense, “the EU’s cultural diplomacy already 
operates ‘beyond’ its interests.” (Isar, 2015, 494)
We might question however whether culture can ever be something that is 
not deployed in an “instrumental” sense, not least from the point of view of 
policy. Figueira (2017), in a brief overview of the content of the EU’s new 
Strategy, has already noted how its rationale is clearly framed by reference 
to a series of assumptions about the increasingly important instrumental 
roles that culture can play in addressing contemporary challenges related to 
conflict and economic development. The result, she argues, is little more than 
a renewed commitment to some of the central themes of Western cultural 
policy that have become dominant in recent years.
Reflecting on the recent evolution of international cultural policy more 
broadly, a number of authors have noted how readily notions such as cultu-
ral diversity and cultural citizenship have become entwined with contem-
porary logics of economic and social management. This has been explored 
for example in Yúdice’s (2003) account of the “expediency of culture” and 
its transformation into a resource for economic and political development; 
Hale’s (2005) account of “neoliberal multiculturalism” and the ways in which 
the tropes of cultural diversity, cultural rights and cultural citizenship have 
tended to reinforce neoliberal and post-neoliberal governmental strategies; 
or Garner’s (2016) study of global cultural policy reform inspired by the 2005 
UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of 
Cultural Expressions (CDCE).
Such work has critically examined the rise of cultural diversity as a reference 
point in a range of policy areas and its multiple uses or “instrumentalities” 
2 “Soft power”, a term often attributed to International Relations scholar 
Joseph Nye, is usually understood as the ability to persuade and co-opt 
others that stems from the cultural influence and attractiveness of states (in 
contrast to “hard power” tools such as the military). “Cultural diplomacy” is 
generally considered as one of the strategies used by actors (usually states) 
in the pursuit of such soft power, such as through cultural exchanges or the 
establishment of cultural institutes in third countries.
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within governmental projects at local, national, regional and international 
levels. On one hand, it has been shown how these developments have often 
helped to open new channels of political and economic engagement and 
participation, while also contributing to an ongoing “democratisation” of 
notions of culture by expanding the traditionally elitist focus on the arts 
to include more popular cultural forms and broader notions of culture as 
a “way of life” (see Bennett, 1998, 102-105). On the other, however, the 
rise of the discourse of cultural diversity has also tended to dovetail with 
contemporary (neoliberal) dynamics of exclusion and inequality, as a series 
of policy narratives about cultural citizenship and the “cultural”/“creative” 
economy have been deployed as an expedient – and often ineffective – solu-
tion to some of the difficulties associated with economic restructuring and 
the socio-political dislocation that has come with globalisation.
Analyses of the integration of culture in the EU’s external relations have 
already explored some of the implications of its recent actions and policy 
pronouncements within the context of debates concerning the regulation 
of the relationship between trade and culture; the changing competences, 
coherence and authority of EU institutions in cultural matters; and the EU’s 
contribution to the international implementation and legal standing of the 
CDCE (eg Pyschogiopoulou, 2014; Souyri-Desrosier, 2014; Isar, 2015; Vlassis, 
2016). However, such work has so far done little to situate an analysis of EU 
policy within some of the themes noted above regarding questions around 
the “uses” or “instrumentalities” of culture in the contemporary context.  
Existing work on EU policy in this field has also tended to take a Eurocentric 
approach in the sense that it has given relatively little attention to questions 
of the relevance and benefits of the EU’s international cultural engagements 
from the perspective of other regions and partners (which, if we were to take 
the new Strategy at its word, should be a key area for examination).
This paper seeks to take these themes up through a focus on the EU’s recent 
attempts to formulate an agenda for culture and development in its external 
relations. After briefly looking at the new Strategy in more detail, the paper 
will go on to consider the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) that was 
signed between the EU and the CARIFORUM grouping of Caribbean states in 
late 2008. This agreement included a novel “Protocol on Cultural Cooperation”, 
guided by the EU’s new commitment to the international implementation of 
the CDCE. Although the initial enthusiasm around the cultural components 
in the EPA cooled in the years after its conclusion, they referenced many 
of the core principles that form the basis of the new Strategy, and came to 
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be hailed more widely as laying down important precedents in the broader 
international culture and development agenda as it has emerged over the last 
decade. The paper therefore goes on to look at the content and the record 
of implementation of the EPA’s culture and development provisions in more 
detail, considering in particular the “uses” of the EPA’s cultural provisions 
from the perspectives of different actors. Some of the lessons learned from 
the EPA are then used to draw out some critical reflections on the EU’s 
approach that has emerged over the last decade and which has now become 
crystallised in the recently adopted Strategy. It should be noted here that, 
by focusing on the theme of culture and development, other important areas 
that are addressed in the new Strategy – such as culture in peaceful inter-
community relations, and cooperation on cultural heritage – are outside the 
scope of this paper.
Towards an EU Strategy for International Cultural Relations
The EU’s Strategy for International Cultural Relations sets out three key 
areas for external cultural engagement: culture as an engine for sustainable 
social and economic development; culture and intercultural dialogue for 
peaceful inter-community relations; and cooperation on the protection of 
cultural heritage (European Commission, 2016). It notes that there are 
important areas of complementarity between these areas, particularly in 
the emphasis on how the promotion of intercultural dialogue and exchange, 
as well as strengthening the protection of cultural heritage, can stimulate 
trade in cultural goods and services and promote cultural tourism, boosting 
job creation and competitiveness both inside the EU and beyond its borders.
These areas of focus are underpinned by a series of core guiding principles, 
which stress in particular the value of cultural diversity, mutual respect and 
inter-cultural dialogue; the principles of complementarity and subsidiarity 
(concerning the respective spheres of authority of EU institutions and 
Member States); and encouraging the promotion of culture through existing 
frameworks of cooperation. In the international development context, these 
existing frameworks include the Development Cooperation Instrument 
(DCI) and the Cotonou Partnership Agreement3 along with related financing 
3 These are the EU’s two major frameworks of engagement for international 
development. Through the DCI the EU engages with 47 countries in Latin 
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instruments such as the Intra ACP Programme, which set aside €40m under 
the current European Development Fund (EDF) to support the cultural and 
creative industries across the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of 
countries between 2014-2020.
The reference to existing frameworks of cooperation has raised some ques-
tions, since the Commission and European External Action Service (EEAS) 
have both suggested that no additional resources will be made available for 
implementation of the Strategy (a point queried by the European Parlia-
ment, which has called for a specific funding stream to be made available for 
international cultural relations) (Galeazzi, 2017). The Strategy does however 
involve the creation of new structures in the EU’s foreign policy architecture, 
something reflected in the launch of an EU Cultural Diplomacy Platform in 
2016. This is intended to give the Commission and EEAS greater leverage 
in promoting their vision with partner institutions around the world. A set 
of guidelines on the implementation of the Strategy has since been provided 
by the European Council, which gives the Cultural Diplomacy Platform a key 
role in carrying the implementation of the Strategy forward and establishes 
a working group to put it into action (European Council, 2017).
Much of the policy content of the new Strategy will be familiar to those who 
have followed recent international trends in cultural policy, particularly 
the areas that relate to international development. The emphasis is on 
support for the cultural and creative industries as areas of activity that can 
play a “dual role” in sustainable development, given their simultaneously 
“economic” and “cultural” nature. In this formula, they are seen to be: 1) 
increasingly significant generators of economic growth and job creation, 
while also 2) vehicles for the expression of identities and the flourishing 
of cultural diversity, intercultural exchange and dialogue. This has become 
a key motif in international cultural policy since the late 1990s, and is a 
key principle on which the CDCE is built. The European Commission was 
delegated by EU Member States and institutions to play a part in negotiating 
the adoption of the CDCE at UNESCO, particularly given the strategic 
importance of this treaty in addressing European concerns over its cultural 
policy autonomy and its internal cultural diversity in the face of ongoing US 
pressures to liberalise access to the EU audiovisual market (Singh, 2008). The 
America, South Asia and North and South East Asia, Central Asia, Middle East 
and South Africa. Through the Cotonou Agreement the EU engages with the 
79 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries.
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negotiation and implementation of the CDCE has thus seen the Commission 
gain competences for culture in external European affairs and, after ratifying 
the CDCE in 2006, the EU also became bound to implement its provisions 
in its international relations. Added momentum for this agenda came from 
the European Commission’s European Agenda for Culture in a Globalising 
World (adopted in 2007), which strongly echoed the CDCE and signaled a 
commitment to the promotion of “culture as a vital element in international 
relations” (European Commission, 2007).
Drawing heavily on the CDCE, the EU’s strategy on culture and development 
that has emerged over the last decade has thus come to share broad similarities 
with what Singh (2011, 107) describes as the “Janus faced” character of the 
CDCE: it evokes broad notions of cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue 
while its substantive provisions are in fact geared toward narrow conceptions 
of the cultural industries as these have been defined as priorities by a number 
of states since the 2000s. One of the limitations of this approach is that it 
has in fact tended to limit the diversity of voices that might advance claims 
turning on the recognition of cultural differences within or between states, 
or outside any obvious market calculus altogether (Albro, 2005). A related 
point is that the cultural sector is one which has tended to be of greatest 
interest to the more developed states/regions and their industry stakehol-
ders, particularly within Europe (and Canada) as it has been engaged in a 
series of high-stake trade disputes with the US. In this vein many European 
actors have tended to frame the discussion around cultural diversity and 
development within their own particular concerns and terms of reference, 
and to lay down international norms and precedents regarding the treatment 
of the audiovisual sector in particular (an objective of EU trade negotiation 
policy that had been approved by the European Council as far back as 2002). 
This has widened the number of stakeholders sharing the same conception of 
cultural diversity, while often diluting and opposing alternative conceptions 
that have been of greater relevance to stakeholders in a number of developing 
contexts (Souyri-Desrousier, 2014, 212; Garner, 2016).
This is not to say that a number of emerging and developing regions have not 
also come to hold a stake in this framework of culture and development as 
it has taken shape over the last decade. The next section will consider a case 
where the EU laid down an early marker in the evolution of its new Strategy 
for culture in international relations through the conclusion of an Economic 
Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the 15 states that make up the regional 
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grouping of Caribbean states known as the CARIFORUM.4 Many within and 
beyond the Caribbean region have noted the potential gains to be made from 
more effectively recognising and exploiting its cultural resources, given its 
world-renowned traditions in areas such as music, carnival and tourism, and 
its global linkages and diasporic ties. With this in mind, Caribbean negotia-
tors found their European counterparts to offer some attractive proposals 
on cultural development cooperation, and the resulting agreement has been 
recognised as an important breakthrough in the implementation of the deve-
lopment components of the CDCE. However, the EPA also demonstrates some 
of the limitations of this framework and can be used to advance a number of 
critical remarks about the EU’s approach on this issue, as well as to reflect 
more broadly on some of the broader questions noted above regarding the 
uses or “instrumentalities” of culture in the contemporary context.
The CARIFORUM-EU Economic Partnership Agreement
A blueprint for culture and development?
Completed in 2008, the EPA scheduled for 92% of bilateral CARIFORUM-EU 
trade to be liberalised over a 25-year period, with the process of adjustment 
and implementation to be facilitated through European aid and development 
cooperation. As with the EU’s EPA negotiations with other regional groupings 
across the ACP, the objectives of the EPA were framed by the 2000 Cotonou 
Partnership Agreement, namely to deepen the integration of the region 
into the global economy by harmonising regional regulation, committing 
signatories to the widening and deepening of trade liberalisation, and brin-
ging trade relations into conformity with World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
rules by removing the preferential arrangements granted by Europe to the 
ACP since 1975 under the “Lomé” agreements.5 European negotiators were 
4 Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Dominican Republic, 
Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, St.Kitts & Nevis, St.Lucia, St.Vincent & the 
Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago. (Haiti did not sign the EPA until 
December 2009. Cuba is formally part of the Caribbean Community of states 
but does not participate in the CARIFORUM and therefore had no part in the 
EPA negotiations).
5 These agreements have been the cornerstone of EU trade and aid relations 
with the ACP since 1975, and the framework in which Europe has maintained 
favoured trade relations in the region by granting preferential market access 
to its tropical agricultural commodities (such as, in the Caribbean’s case, 
bananas and sugar).
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given extra zeal for the EPA negotiations by the EU’s Global Europe strategy, 
unveiled by the European Commission in 2006: a “tough new approach” by 
European negotiators to “improve the competitive position of EU industry 
[and] open new markets for its exporters” (European Commission, 2008a). 
However, since its completion in 2008, implementation of the EPA has 
remained limited and at a largely provisional level, while less than half of 
the CARIFORUM states have ratified it (Silva, 2014).
Nevertheless, the explicit integration of development provisions in a trade 
agreement such as this marked something novel in North-South relations, 
and it laid down a number of precedents regarding culture in particular. 
The EPA attracted international attention as the first international trade 
agreement to make reference to the provisions of the CDCE, notably through 
the inclusion of a Protocol on Cultural Cooperation (hereinafter “Protocol”). 
UNESCO has referred to the EPA as a key instance of implementation of the 
CDCE (UNESCO, 2014, 22-23) and as including the first formal references to 
the CDCE’s provisions on international development cooperation (UNESCO, 
2009). The Protocol was also highlighted in the first official five year report 
on the implementation of the EPA as a “major innovation in North-South 
FTA practice” (Silva, 2014, 49).
For its part, the European Commission was keen to use the EPA negotiations 
as an opportunity to lay down a marker in the context of wider international 
disputes (with the US in particular) over the status of the cultural sector in 
international trade. In giving its account of the inclusion of the Protocol in 
the CARIFORUM EPA, the Directorate-General for Trade of the European 
Commission explained that this was because they wanted to “move early” 
in order to signal Europe’s commitment to the CDCE and reinforce its 
international standing.6 The Commission also referred to the Protocol as a 
“showcase of implementation” of the CDCE that could provide a model for 
future engagements with other regions across the ACP as well as Asia and 
Latin America (European Commission, 2008b; Loisen and de Ville, 2011).
There is a big gap however between the above pronouncements about the 
EPA and its actual content, particularly when it comes to aspects related to 
development. References in the EPA text to development cooperation are 
6  The Trade DG’s explanation of the Protocol was referred to in a hearing on the 
implementation of the Convention at the European Parliament, 27 February 
2008. (transcript in possession of author). 
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stated in very general terms and backed up with few or no time-bound or 
specific measures; in contrast, cooperation measures on market liberalisa-
tion are spelled out in considerable specificity in areas of special interest 
to European firms (see Girvan, 2008; Canterbury, 2009). In fact, the EPA 
appears to worsen the Caribbean’s already disadvantageous terms of trade, 
while also reducing policy space through the removal of tariffs (themselves 
significant sources of revenue for several of the small states in the region) 
and other policy mechanisms that could be used to spur diversification in 
the region. In light of this, Girvan (2013, 99-100) has argued that the EPA is 
characterised by “sweetification”: the highlighting of potential (and largely 
empty) benefits and the downplaying of certain costs of the EPA in order to 
sell it to stakeholders and placate its many opponents.7
Nevertheless, the Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (CRNM)8 that 
conducted the negotiations on behalf of the region’s governments secured 
a number of concessions from European negotiators who were seeking to 
gain favoured treatment for major EU sectors such as telecommunications 
and intellectual property (Vlassis, 2016, 5). One of the CRNM’s calculations 
was a recognition of the region’s dependence on agricultural commodities, 
combined with the fact that more than half of Caribbean export revenue 
was now coming from non-traditional industries, such as tourism and the 
cultural and creative industries, which were not covered under the Lomé 
agreements (Heron, 2009).
In this context, culture came to play an important role in the negotiations. 
The CRNM Director-General referred to the Protocol as a historic concession 
on the part of the EU that could open unprecedented opportunities to the 
Caribbean’s cultural producers (CCIN, 2007). This was echoed by the Carib-
bean Export Development Agency (CEDA), which emphasised the cultural 
industries as one of two priority sectors earmarked for expansion as part of 
7 Opposition to the EPA came from a number of groups, including the Inter-
national Trade Union Confederation, Caribbean Labor Council, Caribbean 
Policy Development Center, Caribbean Association for Feminist Research 
and Action, international NGOs such as Oxfam, Action Aid and the World 
Development Movement, and a number of protest movements in both the 
EU and the Caribbean.
8 The CRNM became absorbed within the Caribbean Community Secretariat 
in 2009 and renamed as the “Office of Trade Negotiations” (OTN). For clar-
ity I refer throughout to the CRNM. Critical observers in the Caribbean have 
pointed to the fact that, since the CRNM was financed by the EU, its ability 
to act independently on behalf of the Caribbean region was compromised.
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the new trade and business relationships set to be built with Europe over the 
coming years (CEDA, 2008). The Director of the Caribbean Council9 referred 
to the Protocol as “the most innovative part of the whole 1000-plus pages 
of the text”, going on to note that it reflected the way in which a number of 
Caribbean states had prioritised the cultural sector as a “line the sand” in 
their negotiating stance (Jessop, 2008). He also noted that the high profile 
that had been given to the issue was also intended to ensure popular political 
backing should the negotiations fail.
Given the significance that has been attached to the cultural provisions of 
the EPA as a breakthrough in the area of culture and development (both 
for the EU and internationally), and as a “line the sand” for a number of 
governments in the region, it is worth looking at their content in more detail.
Beyond “mere” cultural cooperation
The provisions addressing culture and development in the EPA are mainly 
found in the annexed Protocol on Cultural Cooperation (CARIFORUM-EU, 
2008, 1938-1941), with a scattering of further provisions found throughout 
the main text. The Protocol opens by aligning itself with the objectives of the 
CDCE and its concepts and definitions, stressing in particular the principle 
of the dual nature of cultural goods and services (with an emphasis on the 
audiovisual sector) and their special role in fostering greater cultural diversity, 
exchange and dialogue between the two regions. A significant expression of 
these principles in the Protocol is the reference to Article 16 of the CDCE, 
which requires developed country parties to grant preferential treatment 
to artists and cultural practitioners as well as cultural goods and services 
from developing countries. In this spirit, the Protocol provides access to the 
European audiovisual market for co-productions between the two regions: a 
considerable concession, since this is historically one of Europe’s most fier-
cely protected sectors. Such co-productions are not only envisaged as a form 
of joint cultural capacity building but, crucially, can qualify as “European” 
works and therefore satisfy the content and quota requirements of EU Mem-
ber States, providing that Caribbean and European producers respectively 
contribute shares of the production cost not less than 20% and not more 
than 80% of the total – a formula that was described by the CRNM (2008, 
5) as “generous” on the part of the EU. Other provisions highlighted by the 
9 This is a European-based trade, development and investment consultancy 
focused on the Caribbean and Central American region. <www.caribbean-
council.org/>.
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CRNM include the possibility for the Caribbean cultural sector to access 
forms of technical assistance and funding from Europe (CRNM, 2008). There 
have been questions raised over the inclusion of such provisions however, 
given that such support was in fact already available to the region prior to 
the EPA (notably through the EU-ACP Support Programme for the Cultural 
Industries and the EU-ACP Film Fund) (Thiec, 2009).
Another significant provision relates to the protection of Caribbean intellectual 
property throughout Europe, and improved market access for providers of 
cultural services (CARIFORUM-EU, 2008, 1770-1772). Such an extension of 
legally binding market access to cultural practitioners was highlighted by the 
CRNM as a particularly significant concession (CRNM, 2008, 2-3) – even if, 
in practice, its benefits appear likely to be limited to a relatively small group 
of sector professionals.10 Such provisions – which unlike the Protocol are 
covered in the body of the EPA text and therefore carry more legally binding 
force – mark a significant departure from the kinds of vaguer diplomatic 
agreements to promote “cultural exchanges” that have tended to characterise 
international cultural engagement in the past. As noted by both the CRNM 
and the Caribbean Council, such past arrangements were generally framed 
in diplomatic language where “culture was treated in a traditional sense of 
merely cooperation between nations and did not really address market access 
for cultural products and services.” (CRNM, 2008, 1; Jessop, 2008).
It is worth reflecting on this reference to “mere” cultural cooperation, since 
it gives some insight into what was most valued by regional officials as a 
form of cultural engagement: namely, market access and material support 
that carries the potential to spur economic diversification and development. 
The negotiation of the EPA has coincided with a growing recognition in the 
region of the potential of the cultural sector and the need for provisions that 
could be used to develop a new development strategy, particularly in light 
of the expiration of preferential access to the European market in tropical 
agricultural commodities and the ongoing competition from East Asia in 
low-cost manufacturing (see for example CRNM, 2004; Nurse, 2006).
10 The improved access requires that Caribbean applicants for entry to the EU 
have completed a “bona fide contract” to supply an entertainment service, 
and that they fulfil the same criteria as other Caribbean business professionals 
that are granted improved access to the EU. This indeed grants new access to 
Caribbean professionals but, as Girven (2009) notes, there is a double standard 
here in that the EPA mandates the countries of the Caribbean to open the 
majority of their markets to imports of European goods and employees of 
European firms, while reserving Europe’s right to maintain tight restrictions 
on the inflow of Caribbean workers and visitors.
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In this context, the EU’s offer of market access has coincided with the 
ambitions of Caribbean policymakers and negotiators as the most signifi-
cant element in the framework of cultural cooperation, while hastening the 
transformation of culture into a “resource” for economic development (in 
the sense used by Yúdice, 2003). This was the main point driven home by 
one of the major reports commissioned by the CRNM in the 2000s to explore 
the potential of culture for development in the region: “The conclusion is 
that the cultural industries should be viewed as a critical strategic resource 
in the move towards creating sustainable development options.” (Nurse, 
2006, 6-11) To date, however, there has been very little to report in terms of 
actual benefits accruing to the region’s cultural sector from the EPA, and the 
implementation of its heralded cultural components has been very limited. 
We will explore this below.
A spoonful of culture: the EPA’s bitter aftertaste
One of the areas that was highlighted as a key breakthrough in the EPA, 
particularly in terms of its recognition of the link between culture and 
development, was the reference to Article 16 of the CDCE, through which 
the EU offered preferential market access for co-productions between the 
regions. However there has been barely any interest expressed so far in 
negotiating such co-productions (Silva, 2014, 49-50). It is worth noting that 
capacity in audiovisual production in the region generally remains thin and 
concentrated among a handful of countries, a factor which is likely to be 
important when it comes to seeking forms of international co-production 
and assistance (which tend to favour more established operations). Of the 
three awards that went to the Caribbean region in 2009 under the [already 
existing] EU-ACP Film Fund for example, it is indicative that these went 
to proposals from partnerships between groups in the UK and Jamaica, 
Trinidad & Tobago and Barbados (CEDA, 2009). Meanwhile there remains 
some confusion over how co-productions under the EPA might be operatio-
nalised. During a CARIFORUM-EU business forum in 2009 it was pointed 
out to the region’s producers by one European delegate that co-productions 
in the cinematographic and audiovisual sector are not in fact a European 
competence since they are bilateral agreements subject to the economic and 
political objectives of the particular states involved (Thiec, 2009). Uncertainty 
in this regard has increased following the Brexit referendum in 2016, given 
the particular historic and linguistic ties that the UK has with the region.
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Implementation has also been limited by a lack of relevant programmes of 
data collection and knowledge in the region. Jamaica is the only Caribbean 
country to date to have undertaken a full assessment of the contribution of 
the copyright and creative industries to GDP and employment, while a few 
others (eg Barbados, Trinidad & Tobago) have only recently begun to develop 
some partial estimates (Hendrickson, 2012, 29-31). To try to address this lack 
of momentum from within the region, a Regional Task Force on the Cultural 
Industries (RTFCI) was established following the conclusion of the EPA in 
2008, financed by UNESCO and the EU’s Hub and Spokes Programme (an 
“aid for trade” programme which provides support to policymakers and key 
stakeholders in ACP countries in the formulation of trade and development 
policy). However, take-up of the RTFCI’s recommendations across the region 
has been very slow and governments continue to be urged to respond with 
legislative, policy and institutional reforms (Patterson, 2015).
In short, it is difficult to see how the culture and development agenda that 
European and Caribbean negotiators struck agreement upon in 2008 repre-
sents anything more than a “sweetener” (to recall the phrase used earlier) 
aimed at tying the EPA up and making it more palatable to its opponents. 
Soon after the conclusion of the EPA a number of external actors began to 
express unease over the way in which Caribbean actors appear to have had, in 
the words of UNESCO’s Caribbean Culture Consultant Kris Rampersad, “the 
wool pulled over their eyes” (cited in OneCaribbeanLtd, 2010). Meanwhile 
some disquiet also emerged from a number of EU Member States and cultural 
sector stakeholders about the precedent that such arrangements appeared 
to set by bringing the offer of improved market access for culture into the 
sphere of trade negotiations as a “bargaining chip” to gain access in other 
sectors, particularly where this involves countries with relatively developed 
cultural sectors that might actually threaten the position of European firms 
in Europe (these were concerns raised for example over the Protocol on 
Cultural Cooperation that was included in the trade agreement with South 
Korea in 2009) (Loisen and de Ville, 2011; European Coalitions for Cultural 
Diversity, 2009).
Such unease resulted in a change in the Commission’s strategy after 2009, 
resulting in a cooling effect on the negotiation of similar cultural cooperation 
protocols. After the South Korea agreement in 2009, two further agreements 
on cultural cooperation were negotiated alongside trade agreements with 
Colombia & Peru (2012) and Central America (2012). However, these were 
not given the same standing as the CARIFORUM Protocol (a standalone 
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Agreement on Cultural Cooperation in the case of Colombia & Peru; a pro-
tocol attached to the Association Agreement with Central America, but not 
to the trade part) (Souyri-Desrosier, 2014). They were also less committed 
on questions of market access – no preferential treatment was granted to 
the audiovisual sector in either agreement for example – marking something 
of a return to forms of “mere” cultural cooperation.
Cultural diversity and cultural indifference in the Caribbean: limited 
stakeholder involvement
Implementation of the CARIFORUM-EU EPA’s cultural provisions is likely 
to take some time to work through, and so it would be premature to dismiss 
them altogether. However, the picture of inertia and frustration that has been 
painted above is not only a reflection of the fact that implementation is still 
at an early stage. It is also a product of how the culture and development 
agenda found its way into the agreement as an issue that resonated among a 
relatively narrow group of stakeholders clustered around the EPA negotiations 
and the wider international culture and development agenda – namely, the 
Secretariat of the Caribbean Community, the RTFCI and CRNM, as well as 
UNESCO, the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and 
the relevant actors from the EU.
Beyond such groups, the calls for regional consolidation and adjustment in 
the cultural sector have only carried to a handful of countries and sector 
professionals. This is partly due to the fact that some territories in the region 
have more developed cultural sectors and longer connections with export 
markets than others: notably Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad & Tobago and St 
Lucia – in contrast to Guyana, Suriname, Haiti and the other six members 
of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States that come under the CARI-
FORUM grouping. Furthermore, export capacity is further restricted to a 
few sub-sectors (music, book publishing, visual arts and film/television) 
which are better placed for development since they are more commodified 
and commercialised and have had a longer experience of exporting goods, 
services, and intellectual property (Nurse, 2006, 6).
In addition to this limited appeal of the EU’s culture and development 
agenda in the region, there has been frustration at the way in which the 
EPA negotiations and related initiatives aimed at building the cultural sector 
have proceeded with little consultation with relevant stakeholders (CCIN, 
2007; CCIBN, 2008). Those that have taken an interest in the culture and 
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development provisions of the EPA have reacted with caution to the claims 
that they are now a key source of competitive advantage and a priority in 
the region’s development strategy. The founder of the Caribbean Creative 
Industries Business Network (CCIBN, which formed in 2004 in response 
to the EPA negotiations) referred to the cultural components of the EPA as 
part of a “happy-ever-after fairy tale” about the prospects for creators and 
creative enterprises (Leonard, 2009). More widely, those stakeholders among 
the region’s wider cultural sector that have been identified by the architects 
of the strategy as important beneficiaries have had very little relation to the 
kinds of initiatives taken by regional and international negotiators and policy 
elites so far. In one study of the Caribbean music sector in 2009 for example, 
Burke (2010) interviewed a range of stakeholders across 10 countries in the 
region and found that the majority of practitioners were not even aware of 
the EPA and its implications for their industry.
This all points to a clear disconnect that exists between agencies such as 
the CRNM, the EU and UNESCO on the one hand, and many of the region’s 
governments and cultural producers on the other – not to mention the anti-
pathy and mutual distrust that often exists between policymakers and those 
involved in the cultural sector in the region (about which, see Nurse, 2005, 
324-333). There are signs that this situation has begun to change, as some 
governments are shifting their stance on cultural policy and recognising 
the potential of reconceptualising and harnessing culture as a resource for 
economic growth and development. However where this is happening – such 
as in Barbados over the last decade – many cultural practitioners remain 
wary, if not resentful, of all the talk of their new importance as generators 
of national wealth. The lack of consultation and the selective and elitist 
ways that policymakers tend to engage with practitioners in the sector has 
contributed to a sense that the new discourse of the cultural and creative 
industries has been of more concern to a handful of policymakers and the few 
stakeholding companies, and their interlocking directorships, that control 
and manage the Barbadian economy (Best, 2012, 141-144).
Indeed in some parts of the region many of those involved in the cultural 
sector formed part of the active resistance to the EPA, emphasising the 
broader implications of the agreement beyond those surrounding the cultural 
and creative industries. For those involved in the Bare APE (Block the EPA) 
coalition in Haiti for example – where worker and peasant organisations 
were joined by groups such as the Dahomey Dance Troupe, the peasant 
musical group AWOZAM, artists from the Chandèl organisation for popular 
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education and awareness, musicians from the popular protest group Boukman 
Eksperyans – the EPA’s gestures towards partnership and cooperation were 
seen as a new tactic in the EU’s wider, neocolonial strategy of aggressive 
liberalisation that has been pursued in the Caribbean in the recent period 
(Haiti Support Group, 2007). As the Bare APE coalition set out in their joint 
statement addressing the EPA: “We cannot accept a continuation along the 
same path. Agreements like the EPA will accelerate the destruction of our 
economy […] Why jeopardize the future of more than 60% of the Haitian 
population to satisfy the desire of the European powers?” (Haiti Support 
Group, 2007) Such opposition to the EPA widened the gap between many 
civil society actors and those committed to the EPA, and has contributed 
to the poor appetite that there has been for implementation (and, in this 
particular case, was a factor in persuading the Haitian government not to 
participate in the initial signing of the EPA in October 2008).
Conclusion
As the EU consolidates the approach to culture and development that has 
evolved over the last decade, there are a number of observations that can be 
drawn from the analysis that has been attempted here. It has been argued 
first of all that we need to be read the deployment of notions of cultural 
diversity and cultural cooperation in the new Strategy carefully. At first 
glance these may appear free from self-interested or “instrumental” motives, 
as we saw earlier in considering the analysis of Isar (2015). However the 
experience of the negotiation and implementation of the CARIFORUM-EU 
EPA demonstrates that these notions have not only been clearly related 
to a set of instrumental aims involving the cultural sector’s role in econo-
mic and social development (which should come as no surprise, since it is 
questionable as to what extent culture can ever be disentangled from such 
aims), but that they have also been deployed as part of the EU’s pursuit of 
an aggressive international political and economic strategy over this period. 
In fact, given the lack of political will and resources that were attached to 
the EPA provisions aimed at culture’s role in economic and social develop-
ment, the practical “utility” of culture proved more significant in the latter 
sense as a tool of the EU’s broader international strategy. Ironically, this use 
of culture in the negotiations became possible in large part because it was 
now increasingly recognised as a resource to be managed and deployed for 
social and economic development – and therefore something that European 
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negotiators could put on the table in a trade and development context in a 
way that went beyond “mere cooperation” (through offers of market access, 
co-production arrangements etc).
For their part, Caribbean negotiators saw the EU’s proposals on cultural 
cooperation as an opportunity to offset some of the losses involved in EPA 
adjustment and to develop a new strategy of economic diversification. Some of 
the provisions on market access and international cooperation to build cultural 
sector capacity that can be found in the EPA do potentially offer significant 
gains in a region which is rich in world-renowned cultural expressions and 
has extensive global diasporic and cultural-linguistic ties. However, if this is 
to be a model to extend to other developing regions then from the point of 
view of its partners the EU would need to back such provisions up with much 
more substance, for example by devoting more reliable streams of finance 
and assistance than was seen in the EPA, and doing more to recognise some 
of the limitations in productive capacity that exist in developing contexts.
The EU will also need to find a way of offering meaningful commitments on 
areas such as international cooperation and market access without alienating 
Member States and the European cultural lobby. This is a difficult balan-
cing act to achieve, because from the perspective of some European actors 
it appears that the EU’s commitment to protecting and promoting cultural 
diversity within its own borders runs counter to making international com-
mitments on preferential market access. This is a tension that, as we saw, 
resulted in the European Commission scaling down its approach in seeking 
further cultural cooperation protocols after the controversies of the South 
Korea agreement in 2009.
Meanwhile, the renewed attention to culture and development that has 
been expressed in the Strategy adopted in 2016 does not appear to have the 
same sense of urgency that drove the EU’s activism in the previous decade, 
when the European Commission was anxious to “move early” to strengthen 
the international standing of the CDCE and widen its ratification around 
the world. Although the new Strategy adopted in 2016 appears to signal a 
renewed commitment to culture and development in its external relations, 
the other two areas of international engagement that it identifies (peaceful 
international relations and the protection of heritage) currently command 
a greater sense of urgency as political attention becomes directed towards 
the issues of violent radicalisation, refugees and migration, and conflict and 
instability in its neighbouring regions.
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The experience of the CARIFORUM-EU EPA also exposes the relatively 
narrow basis on which the agenda for culture and development that has 
emerged over the last decade has been struck, and the limited involvement 
of stakeholders in this process. It remains unclear how exactly the strategy 
of cultural development that came to be proposed by the EU, CRNM and 
supporting international agencies can benefit the region beyond a handful of 
countries and the relatively few well-positioned producers and professionals 
that have taken an interest. The smaller and less developed countries in the 
region – as elsewhere across much of the developing world – have less stake or 
existing capacity in the cultural and creative economy agendas. Indeed in the 
poorest country in the region, Haiti, the mass mobilisations involving actors 
in the cultural sphere were a factor in articulating opposition to EU strategy 
in the region – a reminder of the multiple uses to which culture can be put.
Bibliography
Albro Robert (2005), “Managing culture at diversity’s expense? Thoughts on 
UNESCO’s newest cultural policy instrument”, The Journal of Arts Mana-
gement, Law and Society, vol 35, n° 3, p. 247-253.
Bennett Tony (1998), Culture: A Reformer’s Science, London, Sage.
Best Curwen (2012), The Popular Music and Entertainment Culture of Barbados: 
Pathways to Digital Culture, Plymouth, Scarecrow Press.
Burke Suzanne (2010), Paper presented at the Sixth International Conference 
on Cultural Policy Research, Jyväskylä, Finland, 24-27 August.
Canterbury Dennis (2009), “European bloc imperialism”, Critical Sociology, 
vol. 35, n° 3, p. 801-823.
CARIFORUM-EU (2008), ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT between 
the CARIFORUM States, of the one part, and the European Community and 
its Member States, of the other part, <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/wider-
agenda/development/economic-partnerships/index_en.htm>, accessed 
07/01/2009.
CCIBN (2008), “Statement by the CCIBN on the launch of the Cultural 
Industries Taskforce”, <www.tropicalfete.com/fusion_news/fullnews.
php?id=1827>, accessed 20/01/2009.
Towards a European strategy on culture and development •
P
O
L
IT
IQ
U
E
 E
U
R
O
P
É
E
N
N
E
 N
° 
56
 | 
20
17
143
CCIN (2007), “Statement from the Caribbean Cultural Industries Network 
on the CARIFORUM-EU Economic Partnership Agreement”, <www.
normangirvan.info/wp-content/uploads/2008/01/statement-from-the-
caribbean-cultural-industries-network-on-the-cariforum-final.doc>, accessed 
20/01/2009.
CEDA (2008), “EU-CARIFORUM Business Forum Launched”, <http://carib-
export.com/website/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=25
3&catid=23>, accessed 02/05/2010.
CEDA (2009), “Caribbean organisations get US$440,000 under EU-ACP film 
programme”, Newsletter of the Caribbean Export Development Agency, n° 5, 
September.
CRNM (2004), “SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS”, 
CRNM/TRINNEX Workshop on the Impact of Trade and Technology on 
Caribbean Creative Industries. October 28-29, 2004, Port of Spain, Trinidad, 
<www.crnm.org/ index .php?opt ion=com_docman&task=cat_
view&gid=166&Itemid=116>,  accessed 20/01/2009
CRNM (2008), EPA Brief: The Cariforum-EC Economic Partnership Agreement 
(EPA): Provisions on the Cultural Sector in the EPA, CRNM Brief 3200.3/
EPA-03 [08].
Galeazzi Greta (2017), “What does the European Parliament say about the 
EU’s international cultural relations?”,  ECDPM Talking Points, 23/03/2017, 
<http://ecdpm.org/talking-points/european-parliament-cultural-relations/>,  
accessed 27/03/2017.
European Coalitions for Cultural Diversity (2009), Letter addressed to the 
President of the European Commission, 7th May 2009, <www.filmdirectors.
eu/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/Letter-Eur.-organisations-FTA-EU-
Korea-7.5.091.pdf>, accessed 18/05/2010.
European Commission (2007), European Agenda for Culture in a Globalising 
World. COM(2007) 242 final.
European Commission (2008a), European Competitiveness, <http://ec.europa.
eu/trade/creating-opportunities/trade-topics/european-competitiveness/>, 
accessed 12/01/2009.
European Commission (2008b), Follow-Up Argumentaire: On the Culture 
Cooperation Protocol in Future Trade Agreements, 13th February 2008,<http://
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/february/tradoc_137751.pdf>, accessed 
4/03/2008
• Ben Garner144
European Commission (2016), Joint Communication to the European Parliament 
and the Council: Towards an EU strategy for international cultural relations, 
Brussels 8/6/2016, JOIN(2016)29 FINAL, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=JOIN%3A2016%3A29%3AFIN>, accessed 13/07/2016.
European Council (2017), “Culture is an essential part of the EU’s international 
relations”: Council adopts Conclusions, Press Release 23/5/2017, <http://
www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/05/23-conclusions-
culture/>, accessed 30/5/2017.
Figueira Carla (2017), “A Joint Communication to the European Parliament 
and the Council: towards an EU Strategy for International Cultural Relations”, 
Cultural Trends, vol. 26, n° 1, p. 81-85.
Garner Ben (2016), The Politics of Cultural Development: Trade, Cultural 
Policy and the UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity, Oxon, Routledge
Girvan Norman (2008), “Implications of the CARIFORUM-EC EPA”, Carib-
bean Policy Development Centre, <www.cpdcngo.org/IMG/pdf/girvanimpli-
cationsepa21jan.pdf>, accessed 07/01/2009.
Girvan Norman (2009), “The great visa divide”, Trinidad & Tobago Review, 
2nd March.
Girvan Norman (2013), “Technification, Sweetification, Treatyfication: Politics 
of the Caribbean-EU EPA”, in Shalini Puri (ed.), The Legacies of Radical 
Caribbean Politics, Oxon, Routledge.
Haiti Support Group (2007), Declaration of the Haitian coalition, ‘Block the 
EPA’ (‘Bare APE’ in Creole). Port-au-Prince, 17 October 2007, <www.
haitisupport.gn.apc.org/EPA.html>, accessed 14/04/2008.
Hale Charles (2005), “Neoliberal multiculturalism: The remaking of cultural 
rights and racial dominance in Central America”, Political and Legal Anthro-
pological Review, vol 28, n° 1, p. 10-28.
Hendrickson Michael (2012), Creative industries in the Caribbean: a new road 
for diversification and export growth, ECLAC: Port of Spain, <http://repositorio.
cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/5049/S2012619_en.pdf?sequence=1>, 
accessed 30/09/2015.
Heron Tony (2009), “Understanding the CARIFORUM-EU EPA”, Paper 
presented to the British International Studies Association annual conference, 
University of Leicester, UK, 14-16 December 2009.
Towards a European strategy on culture and development •
P
O
L
IT
IQ
U
E
 E
U
R
O
P
É
E
N
N
E
 N
° 
56
 | 
20
17
145
Isar Yudhishthir Raj (2015), “Culture in EU external relations: an idea whose 
time has come?”, International Journal of Cultural Policy, vol. 21, n° 4, 
p. 494-508.
Jessop David (2008), “Understanding the EPA: Cultural Services”, Caribbean 
Council, <www.crnm.org/documents/ACP_EU_EPA/epa_agreement/
Understanding_the_EPA_Cultural_Services%20_by_David_Jessop.pdf>, 
accessed 12/12/2009.
Leonard Josanne (2009), “As the EPA Ink Dries”, ICTSD Trade Negotiations 
Insights, February 2009, <http://ictsd.org/i/news/tni/39382/>, accessed 
12/12/2009.
Loisen Jan and de Ville Ferdi (2011), “The EU-Korea Protocol on Cultural 
Cooperation: Toward Cultural Diversity or Cultural Deficit?”, International 
Journal of Communication, vol. 5, p. 254-271.
Nurse Keith (2005), “Popular Culture and Cultural Industry: Identity and 
Commodification in Caribbean Popular Music”, in Christine Ho and Keith 
Nurse (eds), Globalisation, Diaspora and Caribbean Popular Culture, Kingston, 
Ian Randle.
Nurse Keith (2006), The Cultural Industries in CARICOM: Trade and Deve-
lopment Challenges, Report prepared for the Caribbean Regional Negotiating 
Machinery, <www.crnm.org>, accessed 20/02/2010.
OneCaribbeanLtd. (2010), “Clear deficits in Caribbean culture policies, says 
UNESCO consultant”, Regional News, 15th June 2010, <www.onecaribbeanltd.
com/onecaribbeanltd/section.php?IssueID=106&SectionID=4>, accessed 
20/06/2010.
Patterson Perceval (2015), Presentation by the most Hon PJ Patterson, ON, 
OCC, PC, QC on leveraging CARICOM’s human, cultural and natural assets 
for the economic development at the community, 26th Inter-Sessional Meeting 
of the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM), Nassau, Bahamas, 26-27 February 2015, <http://today.caricom.
org/wp-content/uploads/Speech-PJ-Patterson-CARICOM-26th-Inter-
Sessional-Meeting-Feby-26-27-doc-2.doc>, accessed 14/10/2015
Psychogiopoulou Evangelia (2014), “The external dimension of EU cultural 
action and free trade: Exploring an interface”, Legal Issues of Economic 
Integration, vol. 41, n° 1, p. 65-86.
• Ben Garner146
Silva Sacha (2014), Monitoring the implementation and results of the CARI-
FORUM-EU EPA: Final Report, EUROPEAID/129783/C/SER/multi.
Singh J. P. (2008), “Agents of Policy Learning and Change: US and EU 
Perspectives on Cultural Trade Policy”, Journal of Arts Management, Law 
and Society, vol. 38, n° 2, p. 141-160.
Singh J. P. (2011), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organisation: Creating norms for a complex world, London, Routledge.
Souyri-Desrosier Catherine (2014), “Chapter 14 - EU protocols on cultural 
cooperation: An attempt to promote and implement the CDCE within the 
framework of bilateral trade negotiations”, in Lilian Richieri Hanania (ed.) 
(2014), Cultural Diversity in International Law: The Effectiveness of the 
UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of 
Cultural Expressions, Oxon, Routledge.
Thiec Yvon (2009), “Reaping benefits from EPA: Promotion and partnerships 
for the Caribbean Services Sector in the EU markets”, Presentation at the 
1st CARIFORUM-EU Business Forum, 24-25th November 2008, Bridgetown, 
Barbados.
UNESCO (2009), “Information Document - Reference Documents concerning 
Article 16 of the Convention”, Circulated at the Second Extraordinary Session 
of the Intergovernmental Committee for the Convention, 23-25 March 2009, 
Paris: UNESCO.  CE/09/2.EXT.IGC/208/INF.3
UNESCO (2014), Report prepared for the Eighth Ordinary Session of the 
Intergovernmental Committee for the Convention on the Protection and Promotion 
of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, 9-11th December 2014, Paris, UNESCO, 
CE/14/8.IGC/11.
Vlassis Antonios (2016), “European Commission, trade agreements and 
diversity of cultural expressions: Between autonomy and influence”, European 
Journal of Communication, vol. 34, n° 4, p. 1-16.
Yúdice George (2003), The Expediency of Culture: Uses of Culture in the 
Global Era, London, Duke University Press.
Towards a European strategy on culture and development •
P
O
L
IT
IQ
U
E
 E
U
R
O
P
É
E
N
N
E
 N
° 
56
 | 
20
17
147
Ben Garner
Senior Lecturer in International Development Studies,
University of Portsmouth.
ben.garner@port.ac.uk
